





This paper seeks to explain how thought experiments work, and also the reasons why they can fail. 
The paper is split into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy and 
science should be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments, 
and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought experiments. 
According to this account, a thought experimenter manipulates her world view in accord with the 
“what if” questions posed by a thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried 
through the result is either a consistent model, or contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved the 
thought experimenter can conclude that the scenario is possible, if a consistent model cannot be 
constructed then the scenario is not possible. The fourth section of the paper uses this account to 
shed light on the circumstances in which thought experiments fail. 
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This paper seeks to provide an account of how thought experiments work, and of how they can go 
wrong. Philosophers should be interested in this project for two reasons. First, philosophers often use 
thought experiments, especially in ethics and the philosophy of mind, and an understanding of how 
thought experiments work might enable philosophers to use them more successfully. Second, 
thought experiments are epistemically interesting in their own right. In a thought experiment it seems 
we can start from a position of ignorance, sit and think, and gain new knowledge, despite the input of 
no new empirical data. One aim of this paper is to explain the origin of this new knowledge.  
The paper is split into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy 
and science can be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments 
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and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought 
experiments. The fourth uses this account to shed light on the circumstances in which thought 
experiments fail. 
Before the philosophical work, it will be useful to clarify what I mean by “thought 
experiment”. For the purposes of this paper I shall adapt a definition offered by Tamar Szabó 
Gendler and take it that to conduct a thought experiment is to make a judgement about what would 
be the case if the particular state of affairs described in some imaginary scenario were actual 






1.Thought experiments in science and philosophy 
  
Philosophers writing on thought experiments divide between those who restrict their attention to 
thought experiments in science, and those who consider thought experiments in both philosophy and 
in science together.
[1]
 Those who only consider thought experiments in science have not given 
arguments for thinking that thought experiments in science are necessarily different. Their restriction 
seems to result from a strategy of caution – these authors are not sure whether thought experiments 
are similar in philosophy and science, and so just talk about areas where they are convinced their 
account works. In this paper I throw caution to the wind, and concern myself with thought 
experiments in all areas.  There are two reasons why I think this is the best way to proceed. First, on 
grounds of simplicity, if it is possible to produce a unified account of thought experimentation this 
should be preferred. And, the only way to find out whether there is an acceptable unified account is 
to try and construct one. This is what I attempt in this paper.  
Second, there are reasons to be sceptical of the idea that science and philosophy are radically 
distinct enterprises. The work of empirically-inclined philosophers of mind and language is often 
indistinguishable from work in theoretical psychology or linguistics.  The same holds for 
philosophers of physics and theoretical physicists, and for game theorists, economists, and 
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theoretical evolutionary biologists. In many cases, philosophical and scientific pieces of work 
can only be distinguished on the basis of the journals in which they are published. Moreover, 
because of its necessarily non-empirical nature, work involving thought experiments is particularly 
likely to fall on the border between philosophy and science. Articles on the E. P.R experiment, 
Schrödinger’s cat, or bilking experiments (thought experiments showing that causal paradoxes would 
emerge if one could go back in time and kill one’s father), are as likely to be found in the Physical 
Review as the Philosophical Review. Newcombe’s paradox is discussed equally by economists and 
philosophers. Psychologists and philosophers alike worry about the Turing Test and Searle’s Chinese 
Room.  It is hard to distinguish science from philosophy, and even harder to distinguish 
philosophical from scientific thought experiments. For this reason an account of thought 
experimentation that can encompass all thought experiments, whether “philosophical” or 
“scientific”, is to be preferred. 
Occasionally, it has been suggested that while we may not be able to divide thought 
experiments into philosophical and scientific, they can be divided into distinct classes on the basis of 
the type of question that they ask. Some thought experiments, it is said, ask what would happen in a 
hypothetical state of affairs, others ask how we would describe situations, and yet others, how we 
would evaluate them. While I accept that thought experiments can be employed to answer different 
types of question, I suggest that it is a mistake to think of there being a corresponding variety of 
different types of thought experiment.  This is because it is implausible to think that there are distinct 
mental processes at work in considering how things are, in describing them, and in evaluating them. 
Our imaginings are shaped by how we describe situations, and many descriptions are already value-
laden. Thus, if I imagine a small boy setting fire to a cat, I do not first form the image, and then label 
it a case of torture, and then decide that it wouldn’t be very nice of the boy. Rather I imagine a cruel 
boy torturing a cat – the description, and evaluation, are already built into the hypothetical scene. As 
we describe, and evaluate, alongside imagining, there will not be different types of thought 
experiment, some of which just involve imagining, and others of which involve additional activities.  
  
2. Existing accounts of thought experiments 
  
In this section I examine accounts of thought experiments have been proposed by other authors, and 
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show why they are inadequate.  
  
a. Kuhn’s remembering account 
  
Thomas Kuhn puts forward an account of scientific thought experiments in his 1964 paper, “A 
function for thought experiments”. According to Kuhn, during periods of normal science, scientists 
see anomalies but typically turn a blind eye to them. Usually a scientist’s experiences of anomalies 
quickly fade from memory. Knowledge of anomalies is not necessarily altogether lost, however, as 
certain techniques can be employed to bring this semi-forgotten knowledge back into consciousness. 
In Kuhn’s account, thought experiments work by providing scientists with a means of 
retrieving memories of anomalies that they have previously seen, but so far ignored. The narrative 
structure of a thought experiment acts to trigger the memory of the scientist. As a scientist visualises 
the scenario sketched by the thought experiment, he experiences a feeling of déjà vu. This is because 
he has seen the scenario before, and so when prompted by the structure of the thought experiment he 
can work out what would happen if the imagined scenario were actual. Kuhn argues that thought 
experiments have an important role to play in the history of science. They enable repressed 
knowledge of anomalies to come to the attention of scientists. This enables them to appreciate when 
their paradigm is inadequate, and can thus help normal science to enter a revolutionary phase. 
Kuhn’s account manages to explain how knowledge can be gained via thought experimentation. The 
“new” knowledge gained in a thought experiment is remembered knowledge. As such it is not really 
new, and the epistemic puzzle of how armchair experiments can yield knowledge is solved. 
Kuhn himself accepts that his account may not apply to all thought experiments, and indeed 
there is a large class of thought experiments for which it cannot account. According to Kuhn, a 
scientist can work out what would happen in a hypothetical situation because he has seen situations 
of the type being described in the real world. The scientist just has to remember what he has seen 
previously. However, some thought experiments concern situations that cannot have been seen 
before. Consider thought experiments that involve physically impossible scenarios. Einstein running 
along a light beam, for example, or Poincaré’s Flat Land, which involves 2D people exploring a 2D 
environment (Poincaré, 1952, 37-8). As physically impossible situations cannot have been perceived 
previously, Kuhn’s account is incapable of coping with such thought experiments. 
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Simplicity dictates that a common account of all thought experiments should be sought if at 
all possible. For this reason, if an account can be given that encompasses physically impossible 
thought experiments along with others, this should be preferred to Kuhn’s. Later in this paper I 
propose such an account. 
  
  
b. Norton’s argument account 
  
John Norton has proposed an account according to which thought experiments are really just 
dressed-up arguments (Norton 1991, 1996).
[2]
 He aims principally to give an account of thought 
experiments in physics, and supports his position by offering reconstructions of the formal 
arguments that he thinks underlie some of Einstein’s thought experiments. Norton fails to specify 
precisely what he means by “argument”. However, he cannot simply mean “deductive argument”, as 
he explicitly accepts that thought experiments can use inductive as well as deductive inferences. 
Norton’s general approach in showing that thought experiments are arguments is to reduce them to a 
series of propositions. He reduces them to lists of premises and assumptions, leading to a conclusion 
via inferences of a recognised sort. This, I shall take it, is what at minimum he means by “argument”. 
Norton claims that all thought experiments can be reduced to such arguments without epistemic loss. 
Norton’s account should not be accepted.
[3]
 His primary reason for thinking that thought 
experiments are arguments is that he has shown that some of Einstein’s thought experiments can be 
replaced by arguments, but this demonstration is not sufficient to prove his claim. All Norton has 
shown is that Einstein’s thought experiments lead to a conclusion that can also be reached via a 
logical argument. This is insufficient to demonstrate that the argument and the thought experiment 
are actually identical, as the processes via which the conclusion is reached may be quite different in 
the two cases. Indeed the phenomenology of thought experimentation suggests that this is the case. 
Simply put, constructing a thought experiment feels quite different from producing a logical 
argument. Thought experiments are often fun and easy, arguments are usually not. When we perform 
a thought experiment we imagine the situation unfolding in our mind’s eye. We don’t consider 
premises, modes of inference, and conclusions.  
Furthermore, in some cases, thought experiments require types of reasoning that cannot be 
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considered argumentative in any sense, that is that cannot be reduced to anything like a 
premises-conclusion form. Take Hume’s missing shade of blue (Hume, 1978, 6). Hume asks us to 
consider whether someone could imagine what the missing shade of blue looked like without ever 
having seen it. How do we perform such a thought experiment? I suggest that we do something like 
the following: we consider something like the colour charts for shades of paint and imagine a gap, 
and then we try and imagine the missing shade. This thought experiment requires us to imagine what 
it is like to see blue, something that cannot be reduced to propositional form. Other thought 
experiments that involve imagining qualia will similarly not be reducible to arguments, nor will 
thought experiments that require spatial reasoning, for example, one in which we see that a square 
peg cannot go through a round hole of the same diameter. Whatever thought experiments are, they’re 
not simply arguments. Thus Norton’s account must be rejected. 
  
  
c. Brown’s Platonic account. 
  
James Brown agrees with Norton that some thought experiments are merely dressed up reductio 
arguments (Brown, 1991a., 76).  However, he agrees with me that this cannot be the full story, and 
that some thought experiments are not arguments. To account for these, in his 1991 book, The 
Laboratory of the Mind, Brown proposes a Platonic account of thought experimentation, which he 
models on Platonic accounts of mathematics.
[4]
 According to Platonic accounts of mathematics, 
mathematical knowledge can be gained via perceiving, or intuiting, a Platonic realm of numbers. 
Brown claims that the laws of nature are relations between universals, and that thought experiments 
enable us to gain new knowledge of the laws of nature by providing us with access to a Platonic 
realm. When, for example, a physicist constructs a thought experiment concerning the behaviour of 
masses, the physicist gains knowledge via directly perceiving the relations between Platonic 
universals of masses. Brown is concerned primarily with thought experiments in science, but he 
suspects his account will work for philosophical thought experiments too. 
There are several problems with Brown’s account. First, there is no account of how the 
Platonic universals are “perceived”. Brown attempts to block this objection by claiming that the 
mechanisms whereby physical objects are perceived are also poorly understood. Here he misses the 
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force of the objection, which is derived from a causal theory of knowledge. A causal theory 
of knowledge holds that a necessary condition for knowledge is that a causal chain links us to the 
situation we claim to know about. Once we combine a causal theory of knowledge with a claim that 
causes must be physical, or at least spatio-temporal, we rule out the possibility of gaining knowledge 
of Platonic universals. 
[5]
 In addition, if a causal theory of reference is adopted, then a parallel 
argument shows that reference could not be made to any Platonic universals that might exist. 
These arguments against Brown are not fully persuasive, however. Brown will almost 
certainly argue that these causal accounts run into problems in the case of mathematics, and must 
thus be rejected. Here I think we reach an impasse. Debates over the nature of mathematical 
knowledge are too long running for there to be much hope that they will be resolved any time soon. 
In a well-known article Paul Benacerraf (1973) has argued that all current accounts of mathematics 
are unsatisfactory. Some accounts have concentrated on providing a satisfactory account of 
mathematical truth, but run into problems when explaining how we can come to know about these 
truths. Here Platonic accounts are the primary examples. Other accounts, such as the various forms 
of formalism, can deal with the epistemology of mathematics, but fail to provide a satisfying account 
of mathematical truth. As such, in the current state of play, Platonic accounts of mathematics appear 
unsatisfactory, but their defenders can rightly point out that they can deal with problems that other 
accounts of mathematics currently can not. In the absence of an account that is clearly better, 
Platonic accounts of mathematics cannot be entirely ruled out.  
This being said, it is worth noting that a Platonic account of thought experiments requires a 
metaphysics even more bountiful than that required by a Platonic account of mathematics. A 
Platonic account of mathematics just requires there to be Platonic mathematical objects. Brown 
needs a far richer Platonic realm. He needs Platonic universals corresponding to Newton’s rotating 
bucket, and to the string that ties Galileo’s masses together, for example. Brown might protest at this 
and claim that he needs only universals that correspond to the basic physical laws – thus there will be 
universals of Mass and Force and F=ma, but no Bucket or String. Granted, the thought experimenter 
accesses the realm of the Fundamental Laws of Nature through telling a story about tied masses, 
Brown might say, but once they have achieved access, they perceive Mass and Gravity, rather than 
String. This will not do, however, as it does not tie in with the phenomenology of thought 
experimentation. Brown might claim that the phenomenology is misleading. But, if he makes this 
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move, his account is considerably weakened. One of the advantages claimed for his account 
was that it would explain the pseudo-visual nature of thought experimentation, and the ease and 
assurance with which conclusions can sometimes be drawn from thought experiments. If Brown 
claims that the phenomenology misleads, then he can no longer claim these advantages for his 
account. 
To sum up: While there may not be anything better currently available, Platonic accounts of 
mathematics appear unpromising. Brown’s account of thought experiments shares the problems of 
such accounts. In addition, even if it were possible to perceive universals, Brown’s Platonic heaven 
would need to be repulsively over-populated. For these reasons his account should be countenanced 
only as a very last resort. 
  
  
d. Experimentalist accounts  
  
Some authors claim that thought experiments are literally experiments (Sorensen 1992a., Gooding 
1990, McAllister 1996). They accept that regular experimenters manipulate the world, while thought 
experimenters manipulate thoughts, but think that this difference is insignificant compared to the 
features thought experiments and real experiments have in common. For example, both real and 
thought experiments can be used to demonstrate the inadequacies of theories, both involve isolating 
features of phenomenon that are of interest, and so on. 
I’m not sure what to make of claims that thought experiments are literally experiments. It’s 
not as if experiments form a natural kind, such that it might be discovered that thought experiments 
are a species of the genus. Rather than being a claim like “Whales are mammals”, the claim that 
thought experiments are experiments seems more like “Beanbags are chairs”. Beanbags are like 
chairs in some respects, and someone who claims that beanbags are chairs seeks to direct our 
attention to these common features. Still, it remains the case that beanbags and chairs have important 
differences. Similarly, thought experiments are similar to real experiments in some ways, and not in 
others. When shorn of its rhetorical effect, the claim that “Thought experiments are experiments” 
comes down to no more than the claim that studying the similarities between thought experiments 
and real experiments is enlightening.  This may well be the case. However, the fact that real 
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experiments involve manipulations on material objects, while thought experiments do not, is 
a difference between thought experiments and real experiments that cannot be ignored. Real 
experiments can teach us about the world because they involve interacting with the world. In 
contrast, thought experiments are problematic because the source of the knowledge gained via 
thought experiment is unclear.  Crucially, claiming that thought experiments are real experiments 
does not help explain the source of the knowledge gained via thought experiments.  
When it comes to explaining how we can learn from thought experiments, those authors who 
claim that thought experiments are literally experiments supplement their account in various ways. In 
addition to claiming that thought experiments are experiments, Sorensen holds that thought 
experiments are paradoxes. They correspond to “a set of individually plausible yet inconsistent 
propositions” (Sorensen, 1992a., 6). In so far as a thought experiment is identified with a set of 
propositions, however, Sorensen’s account will run into the same kinds of problems as Norton’s 
argument-based account. There are some thought experiments that simply do not have a 
propositional form. David Gooding says that thought experiments involve the “construction of 
experimental narratives that enable virtual or vicarious witnessing” and that “thought experiments 
work because they are distillations of practice” (Gooding, 1990, 204-205). Unfortunately, Gooding 
doesn’t elaborate further, but in these comments he may be edging towards a model-based account of 
thought experimentation similar to that outlined in the next section. 
  
  
2. A better account of thought experimentation 
  
In this section I propose an account that explains thought experiments as attempts to construct 
models of possible worlds. Nancy Nersessian (1992) and Nenad Miščević (1992) have also proposed 
model-based accounts of thought experimentation. Their accounts differ substantially from my own 
in ways that will be spelt out later. In addition, and as mentioned previously, David Gooding (1990) 
makes some comments that suggest he holds some kind of model-based account, and Kathleen 
Wilkes (1988) talks of thought experimenters imagining possible worlds.  
Characteristically, thought experiments present us with a series of “What if” questions. For 
example, we may seek to discover what would happen if there were no friction, or what would 
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happen if people split like amoeba. In performing a thought experiment we temporarily adjust 
our world view in order to construct a model in accord with the answers to these “what if” questions. 
When answering the “what if” questions we predict how imaginary entities would behave in 
the same way that we predict how real entities will behave. Sometimes we will have explicit laws 
governing how entities of the type we are imagining act in the types of situation we are imagining. 
Thus, we can predict how fast imaginary masses would fall under gravity in the same way that we 
can predict how fast real masses fall. We plug the relevant values into equations and calculate the 
prediction. Whether the masses are real or imaginary makes no difference. We can also employ tacit 
understanding of laws that we could not formally state. Sometimes the answers to the “what if” 
questions are provided by implicit laws that are contained in the implications of the concepts we are 
employing. For example it is part of the meaning of “light” that it travels at the speed of light, and 
part of the meaning of “pencil” that it is a writing implement. We can also employ simulation type 
reasoning. If the simulation account of out folk psychological practices is correct (as proposed by 
Gordan, 1986), then this type of reasoning would be employed to predict the behaviour of imagined 
people. 
Roy Sorensen, and before him Ernst Mach, suggest that evolution has fitted us with modal 
intuitions that can be expected to be broadly accurate, at least within commonplace domains 
(Sorensen 1992a., 1992b.; Mach 1960). The idea, loosely, is that those of our ancestors who 
correctly intuited how lions behave in nearby possible worlds were better able to outwit the lions and 
stay alive. Believing that lions can jump 10 ft but not 100ft, that lions are killed when large rocks fall 
on them, and that if a lion catches you she’ll eat you, had survival value.  Against Sorensen, James 
Maffie (1997) convincingly argues that we should expect any evolved ability to intuit modal 
properties to be limited.  “For what difference does believing ‘2+2=4’ is necessarily vs. 
nomologically vs. universally yet accidentally true make in terms of an organism’s evolutionary 
fitness?” (Maffie, 1997, 213). Still, this is not sufficient to rule out the possibility that we might have 
evolved reliable intuitions regarding practical possibility, and if this were so, such instincts could 
also be used working out what would happen in hypothetical situations. 
A point of key importance to my account is that the reasoning employed in constructing 
thought experiments is of a perfectly commonplace kind. Answering the “what if” questions of a 
thought experiment uses the same kind of processes as answering “what if” questions in all other 
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contexts. As human beings, planning, plotting, and imagining are of great importance to us. 
If, for example, we are going to decorate a room or book a holiday we don’t just go ahead and do 
these things, but instead spend some time considering the different courses of action available to us. 
We consider what would happen if we went on holiday to Bournemouth as compared to if we went 
to Turkey, and by comparing the anticipated consequences come to a conclusion as to which type of 
a holiday we would prefer. The forms of reasoning involved in such planning are identical to those 
involved in thought experimentation. 
When a thought experimenter is faced with a “what if” question, she attempts to answer it in 
a rigorous fashion. She follows though all the relevant implications of altering one part of her world 
view and attempts to construct a coherent model of the situation she is imagining. The rigour with 
which thought experimenters attempt to answer “what if” questions is what differentiates thought 
experiments from daydreams and much fiction.
[6]
 In a day dream I might lazily imagine being Prime 
Minister – there I am bossing everyone about, issuing edicts that extend university vacations, and so 
on. In a thought experiment such slap-dash imaginings are not permitted. If I conduct a thought 
experiment in which I dictate that university vacations should be extended, then I am obligated to at 
least sketch a coherent model of the situation – the courses must be correspondingly shorter, degrees 
must be longer, funding per a student greater, and so on. 
The thought experimenter is committed to rigorously considering all relevant consequences 
in answering the “what if” questions. Some consequences, however, will not be relevant to the 
purpose of the thought experiment and can safely be ignored. Consider, for example, the thought 
experiment in which Einstein considered what he would see if he ran along a light beam at the speed 
of light. Now, of course, anyone running at such speeds would be in no position to make 
observations: long before reaching light speeds they would be too tired to notice anything, and their 
running shoes would burn up. Such points, however, are irrelevant to the issues at hand and so can 
be ignored. 
When the thought experimenter has followed through all relevant consequences of the “what 
if” questions, several outcomes are possible. Sometimes when all the “what if” questions are 
answered, the result is an internally consistent model. What do I mean by model? A dynamic 
representation of a situation. The model might consist of a set of propositions describing a situation, 
or it might be pictorial. In my view the form of the model may well differ in different cases, and 
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doesn’t much matter. Indeed I would go so far as to claim that whether a situation is 
modelled in thought alone, or in some more concrete medium such as plasticine, isn’t all that 
important. Human beings have developed their capacity to think via utilising various aids – pen and 
paper, diagrams, and so on. In a sense such tools enable us to externalise thinking. In many cases the 
same mental operations can be performed in different ways. Consider, for example, doing sums in 
mathematics. Some people can only do sums on paper. Some need to use their fingers and toes, and 
count them all up to find the result. Other people can do maths in their heads – of these some will 
imagine what the sum would look like if written down, while others use different methods. All these 
individuals are adding up, and it doesn’t much matter what method they use.  I suggest that the 
differences between mental models and concrete models can be similarly insignificant. One thought 
experimenter will be able to visualise a situation, another will use a scrawled diagram, and a third 
will need to use concrete objects to represent the actors. All three model the situation, and the 
differences between them are unimportant. 
Depending on the account of possible worlds adopted, when the thought experimenter 
produces an internally consistent model she either constructs or represents a possible world. 
Adopting a realist stance towards possible worlds commits one to providing some explanation of 
how we come to know about these “other worlds”, leading to difficulties similar to those that I 
considered problematic for Brown’s Platonist account of thought experiments. Thus, here I will 
adopt an anti-realist account of possible worlds. This is not an essential element of my account, 
however, and those who are willing to countenance realist accounts of possible worlds can 
consistently also accept my account of thought experiments.  
Strictly speaking, as the thought experimenter will not specify irrelevant details in her model, 
she will not produce a single possible world, but rather a template for an infinite number of possible 
worlds. “Possible world”, in the singular, can be taken throughout as shorthand for this infinite set. If 
the thought experimenter manages to construct an internally consistent model, and thus construct a 
possible world, then she can conclude that the situation she has imagined is possible. The strength of 
the possibility, physical or logical, depends on whether the thought experimenter has constrained 
herself to constructing only models where the actual physical laws obtain. 
In some cases, the thought experimenter will be forced to conclude that an internally 
consistent model cannot be produced. Often this will be because following through the “what if” 
Page 12 of 25Thought Experiments
08/01/2008http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/263/1/Thought_Experimentsjm2.htm
questions would result in a contradiction. In other cases, although there is no overt 
contradiction, the thought experimenter will conclude that an internally consistent model cannot be 
produced after numerous attempts to construct such a model have failed. In these cases different 
parts of the model simply will not go together, in a sense analogous to the sense in which the pieces 
of jumbled jigsaw puzzles cannot be made to fit together. If the thought experimenter decides that no 
internally consistent model can be produced she will conclude that the hypothesised situation is 
impossible. Again the strength of the impossibility depends on whether the thought experimenter has 
restricted herself to attempting to construct models in which the actual physical laws obtain. 
Many regard inferences from “It is conceivable that X” to “It is possible that X” with 
suspicion (See, for example, Wilkes, 1988, 17). The claim that because I can form a picture of a fire-
breathing dragon in my mind, fire-breathing dragons are possible is indeed dubious. However, my 
model-based account of thought experiments avoids these problems. The thought experimenter does 
not simply visualise herself dropping linked masses, for example, rather she constructs a model in 
which she drops linked masses using what she knows about physical laws and the implications of her 
concepts. Physical laws, and our concepts, have modal implications built into them already. The law 
that masses attract each other implies that masses in all physically possible worlds attract. Similarly, 
our concept of number implies that whatever other scandals may one day come to light the number 
five cannot be the illegitimate offspring of Tony Blair (example adapted from Nagel 1998). In so far 
as we believe our scientific theories to be correct, and have a good grasp of our concepts, we can use 
them to support modal claims. Thought experiments merely make use of modal implications to 
which we are already implicitly committed.  
On my account, thought experiments can show us whether or not a situation is possible. In 
doing this they can indirectly teach us about the actual world. Discovering that a situation is 
impossible shows us how the world cannot be. Similarly, discovering that a situation is necessary 
shows us how the world must be.  
Thought experiments can also be used to explore our model of the actual world, that is they 
can be used to reveal the implicit consequences of our theories about the world. Thought 
experiments that seek to discover what our intuitions would be in hypothetical circumstances are of 
this type. In such thought experiments we construct, and in the process, describe, a possible world in 
which there are apparently intelligent Martians, or in which someone is presented with the option of 
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killing one person to save many. Such thought experiments teach us nothing about the world, 
but rather allow us to explore the implicit consequences of our pre-existing beliefs. 
Brown has claimed that thought experiments can also provide us with new knowledge about 
what contingently happens to be the case in the actual world. If Brown’s claim is correct such 
thought experiments pose a serious threat to my account, as it is difficult to see how knowledge of 
contingent states of affairs can be derived from the construction or representation of possible worlds. 
Brown’s putative example of a thought experiment that provides us with knowledge of 
contingent matters of fact is one that Galileo used to both demonstrate the falsity of Aristotelian 
physics, that held that heavy bodies fall faster than light bodies, and also to suggest the correct 
Galilean result, that all bodies fall at the same rate (Galileo, 1974, 66-67). Galileo asks us to imagine 
two falling bodies, one heavy and one light, that are tied together. The Aristotelian principle leads us 
to conflicting conclusions. First, we can conclude that, since the light body falls more slowly, by 
tying the two together the heavy body will be slowed down. Second, we can conclude that since the 
mass of the compound body is greater than that of the heavy body alone, the heavy body will now 
fall more quickly. This contradiction shows that Aristotelian physics is wrong and that heavier 
bodies cannot fall more quickly that light bodies. This is the reductio stage of the thought 
experiment. So far my account has no problems, I can say that the thought experiment showed that 
no consistent model could be produced in which heavy bodies fall faster than light bodies, and that 
thus it could be concluded that the Aristotelian scenario is impossible and so not true of the actual 
world. 
The second stage of the thought experiment is more problematic. Galileo now goes on to 
draw the conclusion that all masses fall at the same rate. An important point is that Galileo need not 
have reached this conclusion. Showing that heavy bodies do not fall faster than light bodies is 
consistent with a multitude of alternative theories, such that red balls fall faster than balls of other 
colours, that square objects fall faster and so on. Brown thinks that Galileo’s success in picking the 
right theory can only be explained by his Platonic account. For Brown the thought experiment 
enables Galileo to perceive the Platonic laws that govern the movement of masses and so see that all 
masses fall at the same rate. 
The challenge for my account is to explain how Galileo could have gained knowledge of 
contingent states of affairs though constructing or representing possible worlds. I think that Galileo’s 
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success can be accounted for by thinking of the thought experiment as one that shows that a 
situation is impossible, working in tandem with various background assumptions. The background 
assumptions are that colour, shape, chemical composition and so on have no effect on the rate at 
which a mass falls. These background assumptions serve to limit the options available to Galileo as 
he attempts to discover the laws governing the behaviour of falling masses. The only options 
consistent with the background assumptions are that heavy masses fall more quickly than light 
masses, that light bodies fall more quickly than heavy bodies, or that all masses fall at the same rate. 
The reductio stage of the thought experiment shows that heavier masses cannot fall more rapidly 
than light masses, and a parallel thought experiment would show that light bodies cannot fall more 
quickly than heavy bodies. Thus the thought experiment can reveal that the remaining option, that all 
masses fall at the same rate, is correct. However, this option is not generated by the thought 
experiment as Brown mistakenly believes, but was put into the thought experiment at the beginning 
as a background assumption. My modelling account can allow for knowledge of contingent states of 
affairs that is generated in such a way, and so escapes the threat posed by Brown’s claim that thought 
experiments can teach us about contingent matter of fact. 
The account of thought experimentation I have put forward in this section is similar in some 
respects to those proposed by Nancy Nersessian (1992) and by Nenad Miščević (1992). The main 
claim of all three accounts is that a thought experimenter gains knowledge through manipulating a 
model. There are however, important differences between the other accounts and my own. 
First, and most importantly, Nersessian’s and Miščević’s models are specifically mental 
models of the type thought by some cognitive psychologists to be involved in the comprehension of 
narratives. Specifically, both philosophers claim to have based their accounts on the work of the 
psychologist  P.N.Johnson-Laird. Nersessian tells us, rather mysteriously, that a mental model is not 
a linguistic representation, nor a picture in the mind, but a “structural analog of the situation 
described” (Nersessian, 1992, 297). Miščević seems to have a more pictorial view of mental models 
and claims that mental models have a “concrete and quasi-spatial character” (Miščević, 1992, 220). 
Both accounts are based on contestable empirical data. If it turns out that mental models of the type 
posited do not exist, then these accounts must be rejected. In contrast, my account uses a much 
looser notion of “model”. Whether the thought experimenter reasons through the situation via 
manipulating a set of propositions, or a mental picture, or even plasticine characters, makes no 
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difference to my account. In my account the form of the model is unconstrained. This means 
that my account can cope with possible changes in the details of psychological theory in a way that 
Nersessian’s and Miščević’s cannot. 
Second, Nersessian’s models are restricted to simulating the way in which phenomena would 
unfold in the real world (Nersessian, 1992, 295). Miščević’s examples suggest that he holds a similar 
view. In contrast, in my account, modelled phenomena do not necessarily unfold as they would in 
the real world as the thought experimenter may model a world in which some laws of nature are 
suspended or altered. This difference is important. It means that my account can cope with thought 
experiments that hypothesise physically impossible situations.  
Third, Nersessian’s models are manipulated in accord with a special “simulative model-based 
reasoning” (Nersessian, 1992, 296). This reasoning specifically excludes the use of deductive and 
inductive inferences, as it is not performed on propositions (Nersessian, 1992, 297). In my account 
the basic forms of reasoning used to manipulate the model will be the same as those we use to 
predict occurrences in the real world: although such reasoning is not limited to induction and 
deduction, such inferences are definitely permitted. On this point Miščević agrees with me. He also 
allows that deductive and inductive reasoning can be employed (Miščević, 1992, 215).  
  
  
4. When thought experiments fail. 
  
My account predicts that thought experiments may fail in two ways. The first reason thought 
experiments can fail is if the thought experimenter is unable to answer the “What if?” questions 
correctly. Maybe she has no knowledge, either explicit or implicit, of the laws that govern the 
behaviour of the type of entities she is imagining. Maybe she has knowledge of the laws relevant for 
predicting the behaviour of entities of the imagined type in the actual world, but the laws do not 
apply in the hypothesised situation.  
I suggest that Bernard Williams’ thought experiment concerning people that split like amoeba 
is an example of a thought experiment that fails because we are unable to answer the necessary 
“what if” questions (Williams, 1973, 23). Williams asks, “What if people split like amoeba?”, but we 
are unable to answer. How exactly could people split like amoeba? Would they split down the 
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middle, and have one leg and one hand each? In that case they would fall over, and unless 
skin suddenly grew to cover their wounds their organs would fall out. Or are they supposed to split 
into two mini but complete people? Then presumably, prior to splitting, a person would have to 
sprout an extra head, legs and arms. Either way, the biological logistics required to get the scenario 
off the ground are too complex and gruesome to work out.    
The thought experimenter is more likely to make a mistake in answering the “what if?” 
questions if the laws she is using to provide the answers are implicit rather than explicit. When a law 
is explicit, as they typically are in field such as physics, the thought experimenter can clearly see 
whether the law applies to the situation she is imagining and knows how to apply it. In areas where 
the concepts we use are less well defined the thought experimenter has to sharpen her concepts as 
she goes along. As she searches for ways of extending her concepts to deal with previously 
unencountered circumstances she will often rely on analogy. However, reasoning by analogy 
depends on perceived similarity and what similarities are perceived is critically influenced by the 
way in which two situations are presented. This is why thought experiments using vaguely defined 
concepts, for example “person” are so open to criticism (see Wilkes, 1988, for more on this point).  
The second reason why thought experiments can fail is because the thought experimenter can 
make a mistake as to whether she has constructed an internally consistent model. Inconsistency may 
be difficult to spot. Mathematicians can construct superficially convincing but false proofs, and 
Escher’s pictures appear to represent actually impossible situations. 
As an example of a thought experiment that fails because the thought experiment thought 
there was inconsistency where there is not, consider this ancient thought experiment that purports to 
show that the universe is infinite by a reductio argument (taken from Sorensen, 1992a, 115). We are 
asked to imagine a man at the end of the universe who throws a spear. The spear cannot go forwards 
because there is literally nowhere for it to go. Thus it must rebound, which is absurd. We are left to 
conclude that the universe has no edge and so is infinite. This thought experiment fails because the 
thought experimenter has overlooked the fact that it is actually possible for a surface to both be finite 
and have no edge, the surface of a sphere is an example. The thought experimenter mistakenly saw a 
contradiction when there is none. 
In general, we can say that a thought experiment is more likely to succeed if the thought 
experimenter is knowledgeable about the relevant aspects of the actual world. Only if she possesses 
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either explicit or implicit knowledge of the behaviour of real phenomena can the thought 
experimenter predict how hypothetical events would unfold. It also helps if the knowledge being 
used to answer the “what if” questions is explicit rather than tacit. When our knowledge of a law is 
explicit, as it typically will be in fields such as physics, we can see clearly whether the law applies to 
the situation being imagined. A final, and rather mundane, thought is that it will best to keep the 
imagined situation as simple as possible if we are to avoid getting confused as to whether or not an 
imagined scenario is consistent. 
Thought experiments can lead us astray. This has led some to suggest that they should be 
abandoned, and that thought experiments can and should be replaced by real experiments.
[7]
 These 
writers are wrong. Although fallible, thought experiments are required for several reasons. Some 
thought experiments are practically possible, but there may be sound reasons for performing them in 
thought only. They may be unethical, or far too expensive to perform in practice. Other thought 
experiments cannot be replaced by real experiments because they are physically impossible. These 
thought experiments may either involve idealisation or the direct violation of physical laws. I shall 
argue that it is untenable to reject the use of thought experiments of either type.  
First, for thought experiments involving idealisation. An example is Galileo’s thought 
experiment demonstrating that bodies continue moving with constant velocity in the absence of a 
force (as described in Sorensen, 1992a, 8-9). Galileo asks us to consider a ball rolling in a friction-
less U-bend. When dropped from one side, the ball rises to the same height on the second. As the 
second side is stretched out the ball has to travel a greater distance to re-obtain the height from which 
it fell. In the limit, if we flatten the second side, the ball will have to travel an infinite distance in an 
attempt to regain its height.  
The first point to note is that thought experiments that involve idealisation often resemble the 
limiting case of the extrapolation of experimental results. When trying to prove a general law, 
scientists often plot the results of some performed experiments on a graph and then interpolate and 
extrapolate from these. Intuitively, the infinite number of possible experiments represented by the 
points on the line are not thought experiments, although the limiting case of a series of experiments 
performed with ever decreasing amounts of friction, say, may well be a thought experiment. The 
difference, it seems to me, lies in the fact that in the case of the thought experiment the experimenter 
visualises or describes some hypothetical situation, whereas the extrapolator does not imagine the 
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infinite number of possible experiments that concern him. However, aside from the 
visualisation element, extrapolation and thought experiments involving idealisation are very similar. 
Critics of thought experiments that involve idealisation are going to have a tough time saying why 
extrapolation is justified (as they must, if they are not to reject much science) but such thought 
experimentation is not. 
Interestingly, thought experiments that aim at exploring our concepts and values by 
describing some situation and then asking us what we would say or do involve idealisation. Imagine 
a situation in which an agent is faced with having all her fingernails pulled out one by one by a 
sadistic but powerful torturer. She can stop the torture at any point by pressing a red button that will 
trigger a nuclear explosion and thus kill everyone, herself included. Often when such thought 
experiments are put to us we are asked what we would do. However, I suggest, what we would do is 
not really the issue. In several (maybe most) near-by possible worlds in which I have my fingernails 
pulled out, I loose all self-control under the pain and press the button. In some of these possible 
worlds, you are just as pathetic. Thus, rather than it being relevant what we would say or do, we 
should be interested in what some ideally calm, good, and rational person would say or do. In such 
cases thought experiments trump real experiments. The judgements of people contemplating what 
should be done under torture are more reliable than the judgements of people actually being tortured. 
Other thought experiments cannot be replaced by real experiments because they involve the 
violation of physical laws. Thus they cannot be performed, nor even approximated. The purpose of 
such thought experiments is to shed light on logical possibility. Such thought experiments are very 
similar to the computer simulations that scientists often run in order to see how events would unfold 
if the laws of nature were slightly different.
[8]
 For example, physicists can use computers to model 
how the universe would unfold if G, the gravitational constant, were different. The thought 
experimenter models a different world in her head; the simulator uses a computer. At least in simple 
cases, a thought experimenter with a clear grasp of the relevant laws should be as reliable as a 
computer simulation. Philosophers who are suspicious of thought experiments in which physical 
laws are violated are going to need to provide a reason why models produced by people are 
worthless, but computer simulations can be trusted (and they must trust computer simulations, or 
once again they are forced to reject much scientific practice). I suggest no such reasons will be 
forthcoming, and that simulations and physically impossible thought experiments should both be 
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In this paper I have presented an account of thought experiments. According to this account, a 
thought experimenter manipulates her world view in accord with the “what if” questions posed by a 
thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried through the result is either a 
consistent model, or contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved the thought experimenter can 
conclude that the scenario is possible, if a consistent model cannot be constructed then the scenario 
is not possible. 
The account differs from Nersessian’s and Miščević’s model-based accounts in various ways. 
Most importantly, their accounts claims that thought experimenters use mental models, of a type 
posited by some psychologists. In contrast, in my account the nature of the model used by the 
thought experimenter is unconstrained.  
I have suggested that thought experiments can fail in two ways: The thought experimenter 
may be unable to answer the “what if” questions, or the thought experimenter may make a mistake as 
to whether she has constructed a consistent or inconsistent model. Despite their fallibility, however, 
thought experiments can enable us to gain knowledge. Those who argue that they should be replaced 
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 Brown, Gooding, Kuhn, Mach, McAllister, Nersessian and Norton concern themselves with 
thought experiments in science; Sorensen and Wilkes write about thought experiments in all areas 
(although Wilkes is sceptical about the value of thought experiments in philosophy).    
[2]
 Bunzl (1996) claims that all knowledge producing thought experiments are deductive arguments. 
I reject his account for the same reasons that I reject Norton’s.  Häggqvist (1996) presents an account 
whereby thought experiments are not arguments but “work only through their connection with 
arguments”. Sidelle (1998) convincingly argues that when the details are spelt out Häggqvist’s view 
collapses into the claim that thought experiments are arguments. 
[3]
 Other writers have given other reasons for rejecting Norton’s account. Gendler (1998) shows that 
one of Galileo’s thought experiments cannot be construed as an argument. Bishop (1999) argues that 
Norton’s account cannot account for cases where people disagree about the results of a thought 
experiment. In such cases the parties reconstruct the thought experiment as two different arguments, 
but they are discussing the same thought experiment. 
[4]
 Brown provides a brief overview of his account in Brown (1991b.)
 
[5]
 Brown argues against a causal account of knowledge on the basis of the EPR experiment. He 
claims that we gain knowledge about the electron’s mate but there is no causal link between the two 
electrons. However, theories involving tachyonic connections between the electrons would supply 
the missing causal link (Maudlin 1994). 
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[6]
 I accept that pieces of fiction may count as thought experiments, so long as the “what if” 
questions are rigorously followed through. See Davenport (1983) and John (1998) for discussion of 
literature as thought experiment. 
[7]
 Writers who have argued that real examples should be used instead of thought experiments 
include Hull 1997. Wilkes 1988 is sceptical of thought experiments in philosophy. 
[8]
 Humphreys 1993 p.219 also notes that such computer simulations are like thought experiments.
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